Cercetare Romania

“Justice: What’s the right thing to do?” al lui Michael Sandel (12 module) este unul dintre cele mai faimoase cursuri tinute vreodata la Harvard.

In el se discuta o serie de principii etice fundamentale, exemplificate cu o bogata cazuistica. Recomandate tuturor cercetatorilor care lucreaza cu subiecti umani, medici, filosofi,politicieni samd.

In aceasta pagina veti gasi cursurile 1-6 iar in pagina urmatoare cursurilr 7-12.

1.Despre Moralitatea Crimei

Cursul acesta face o introducere interesanta in filosofia utilitarianista (search pe google pentru John Stuart Mill daca vreti sa stiti mai multe)

Impartit in doua:

1. Despre moralitatea crimei: daca ai avea de ales intre (1) a ucide o persoana pentru a salva alte cinci si (2) a nu face nimic stiind ca prin aceasta cinci persoana ar muri chiar in fata ochilor tai – ce ai face?

2.Despre canibalism – un celebru caz din secolul XIX in care capitanul unui vas naufragiat decide sa il ucida pe cel mai slab dintre supravietuitori pentru a il consuma, neavand alta sursa de hrana.

Discutiile la care se preteaza cursul (preluare de pe http://www.justiceharvard.org/?option=com_content&view=article&id=64&catid=21:episode-one&Itemid=7)

Harming the Innocent

According to the principle of utility, we should always do whatever will produce the greatest amount of happiness and whatever is necessary to prevent the greatest amount of unhappiness. But what if the only way to produce happiness, and to prevent unhappiness, is to harm or even kill innocent people?
1.    Suppose you are driving through a narrow tunnel and a worker falls onto the road in front of you. There is not enough time for you to stop. If you keep straight, you will hit the worker and kill him, but if you swerve left into oncoming traffic, you will collide with a school bus and kill at least five children. What’s the right thing to do? Does utilitarianism get the right answer?
2.    Suppose ten thousand innocent civilians live next to a munitions factory in a country at war. If you bomb the factory, all of them will die. If you don’t bomb the factory, it will be used to produce bombs that will be dropped on fifty thousand innocent civilians in another country. What’s the right thing to do? Does utilitarianism get the right answer?
3.    Suppose a man has planted a bomb in New York City, and it will explode in twenty-four hours unless the police are able to find it. Should it be legal for the police to use torture to extract information from the suspected bomber? Does utilitarianism get the right answer?
4.    Now suppose the man who has planted the bomb will not reveal the location unless an innocent member of his family is tortured. Should it be legal for the police to torture innocent people, if that is truly the only way to discover the location of a large bomb? Does utilitarianism have the right answer?

Telling the Truth

The principle of utility tells us to do whatever is necessary to minimize pain and unhappiness, but pain and unhappiness have many sources. There are times when telling people the truth would make them very unhappy. Should you lie to a person whenever lying is the only way to spare his or her feelings and prevent unhappiness?
1.    Suppose your friend likes to sing in the shower, and he thinks he is an excellent singer. In fact, however, he sounds truly awful. Should you tell him the truth, even if it will ruin his self-confidence? Does utilitarianism have the right answer?
2.    Suppose a man has been missing for many years, and you have just learned that he is dead. Should you tell the man’s father, even if it will crush his hopes and send him into despair? Does utilitarianism have the right answer?
3.    If you think it would be wrong to lie in one or both of these cases, do you think there is sometimes a moral duty to tell the truth despite the consequences? Does this duty mean that the principle of utility is mistaken?

Living Your Life

    The principle of utility says that we should always maximize happiness. It does not matter whether we are deciding on the laws of our country as citizens and officials, or whether we are deciding what to do in our own private lives. In every possible case, the principle of utility tells us to choose the course of action that will produce the greatest amount of happiness. Is that right?
1.    There are many needy people in the world who could benefit from your help. If you were to volunteer one evening per week, you could reduce need and thereby increase the sum of happiness. But if you were to volunteer all of your evenings, then you could produce even more happiness. Should you volunteer all of your spare time to helping the needy? Would it be wrong not to do so?
2.    There are many poor people in the world who lack the money to buy food, clothing, shelter, and medicine. If you were to donate $100 to a charity such as Oxfam, then some of these people would get what they desperately need and you would thereby increase happiness. But if you were to donate all of your spare income each month, then even more people would get what they desperately need and you would produce even more happiness. Should you donate all of your spare income to charities such as Oxfam? Would it be wrong not to do so?

2. Care este costul vietii

Se poate pune un pret pe viata unui om? Daca da, care este acesta. In prima parte a cursului Sandel prezinta o serie de cazuri in care viata unui om a fost monetizata. In partea a doua vorbeste despre J.S.Mill si despre compatibilitatile principiului sau fundamental “cel mai mare beneficiu pentru cel mai mare numar de persoane” cu drepturile omului.

Discutiile la care se preteaza cursul (preluare de pe http://www.justiceharvard.org/?option=com_content&view=article&id=66&catid=21:episode-one&Itemid=7)

Describing Utilitarianism

According to the principle of utility, an action is right insofar it tends to increase happiness and wrong insofar as it tends to decrease happiness. In other words, the principle tells us that the right thing to do is always whatever will produce the greatest amount of happiness and whatever is necessary to prevent the greatest amount of unhappiness.

But how are we supposed to figure out what to do in a particular, real-life situation? Suppose that we have to choose between building a new sports stadium and building a new hospital. According to Bentham, we should consider how much pleasure sports fans would get if we were to build a new stadium, and how much pain sick people would be relieved of if we were to build a new hospital. If building the stadium would produce a greater balance of pleasure, then we should build the stadium. This explanation reveals three important features of Benthamite utilitarianism.

1. For utilitarians like Bentham, happiness is simply pleasure and the absence of pain. People are happy insofar as they feel pleasure, unhappy insofar they feel pain; there is nothing else that goes into happiness. Abilities, achievements, friendship, love—all these are, at best, only means to being happy, and only insofar as they give rise to pleasure.

2. The second feature of Benthamite utilitarianism is that it counts all pleasures and pains, and it treats every type of pleasure and pain as equal. If the quantity is the same, the pleasure of mocking someone counts just as much as the pleasure of helping someone. The pleasure of having a successful career can, in principle, be outweighed by the pleasure of eating a great many ice cream cones. The same goes for pains. The pain that someone feels when they are insulted can, in principle, be outweighed by the pleasure that another person derives from the insult.

3. The third feature of Benthamite utilitarianism is that it permits sacrificing one person’s interests for the sake of the majority. If the greater balance of pleasure would be produced by building a sports stadium rather than a hospital (say, because there are few sick people but many sports fans), then the principle of utility tells us to build the stadium—even if a small number of sick people will suffer greatly as a result.

Evaluating Utilitarianism

In your discussion, try to evaluate these three features.

1. Is it true that happiness is simply pleasure and the absence of pain, and that the goal of all human action should be pleasure? Or is utilitarianism too crude as a moral doctrine?

2. John Stuart Mill tried to defend utilitarianism against this charge by arguing that greater weight should be put on “higher” pleasures. But which pleasures are “higher” pleasures? Mill proposed that, of two pleasures, the pleasure preferred by a majority of people who had experienced both pleasures should be counted as the higher pleasure. Is this a good way to distinguish “higher” from “lower” pleasures? Does the majority, even when it is well-informed, always prefer the “higher” pleasure? Does Mill’s proposal succeed in making Utilitarianism less crude? If not, is there another way to defend utilitarianism against this charge?

3. Are all goods commensurable? Can they all be weighed on a common scale, or is it possible that the value of some goods, such as love, cannot coherently be balanced against the value of other goods, like money? Is this a fatal problem for utilitarianism?

4. Do all pleasures deserve to be counted—even objectionable pleasures, like the pleasures that racists derive from being racist?

5. John Stuart Mill thought that the right laws, education, and public opinion would prevent people from having objectionable desires. Was he right to be so confident about this? Either way, does the fact that utilitarianism counts all pleasures make it admirably neutral or hopelessly defective?

6. Does utilitarianism threaten individual rights? What if the sum total of the pain caused by sacrificing the civil rights of a minority is less than the sum total of the pleasure derived as a result by the majority?

7. John Stuart Mill tried to rebut the objection that utilitarianism cannot account for individual rights. He argued that, far from being in tension with individual rights, the principle of utility was actually the justification for protecting rights. In other words, Mill believed that protecting individual rights is the best way to increase the sum of happiness in the long run. Was Mill right? Either way, is this really the reason why we should not violate people’s basic rights?

 

3. Despre libertatea de a alege

Filosoful Robert Nozick considera ca, daca cand statul ii ia un dolar lui Bill Gates si il da unui sarac este de fapt el il obliga pe Bill Gates sa lucreze pentru acel sarac – este redistributia banilor de la buget o forma de munca silnica? Cursul lui Sandel vorbeste despre redistributia banilor din taxe si despre moralitatea acestui fapt

Utilitarians think that the right thing to do is whatever produces the greatest amount of happiness. Libertarians disagree. They think that we must never violate anyone’s “rights”—even if doing so would increase overall happiness.

According to libertarians, the greatest threat to individual rights comes from the government. Libertarians think that many kinds of laws violate people’s rights. Whenever the government prohibits a self-endangering activity—like driving without a seat belt—it is being unacceptably paternalist. Whenever the government prohibits deviant but harmless behavior—like nonstandard sexual practices—it is being oppressive. Whenever the government taxes people for redistributive purposes, it is stealing from them and forcing them to work for the benefit of other people.

A good way to kick-start a discussion about libertarianism is to examine what libertarians say about redistributive taxation.

Distributive Patterns and Liberty

Robert Nozick, a libertarian philosopher, has three arguments against redistribution. The first argument observes that government tends to redistribute wealth according to some pattern. For example, it tends to tax rich people and spend money on poor people, so that there is more equality in the distribution of income, wealth, and other resources. But, Nozick believes, it is not possible to maintain a pattern like equality without restricting people’s liberty.

Suppose everyone in the United States had the same amount of money, and we all gave 25 cents to Michael Jordan in exchange for the pleasure of watching him play basketball. Then Jordan would have much more money than everybody else, and there would no longer be a pattern of equality. To restore the pattern, the government would have to take the money we gave to Jordan and give it back to each of us. And to maintain the pattern, it looks like the government would have to permanently forbid us from doing what we want with the money we have.

According to Nozick, this thought-experiment shows that all taxation for redistributive purposes is unjust. But is that right?

1. Must the government stop trying to make poor people less poor, and sick people less sick, and so on, or is it possible to maintain a desirable pattern without restricting people’s liberty to do what they want with what they own?

2. Even if it’s not possible to maintain a desirable pattern without restricting liberty somewhat, is Robert Nozick right to think that people should have the liberty to do whatever they want with the things they own?

3. Is it permissible for the government to regulate market transactions with an eye on the effects they have on the participants and other people?

4. Is it permissible for the government to pass laws against price gouging in the wake of a natural disaster?

5. Is it permissible for the government to regulate employment contracts? Are minimum wage laws really unjust?

6. Is it permissible for the government to insist on health and safety standards in workplaces?

7. Is it permissible for the government to block companies from forming a monopoly?

Redistributive Taxation and Forced Labor

Nozick objects to patterns like equality for a second reason. Maintaining a pattern requires taking a richer person’s earnings and giving them to a poorer person. But, thinks Nozick, taking the earnings of two hours of labor from the rich person is like taking two hours from the rich person. It is like forcing the rich person to work for two hours for the benefit of the poor person. Therefore, says Nozick, redistributive taxation is like forced labor. Is Nozick right?

1. Is redistributive taxation really like forced labor? Forced labor is a kind of slavery. Are rich people who have to pay taxes like slaves? In what sense?

Justice and What Really Happened

Nozick’s third argument against redistribution says that redistribution is incompatible with an “historical” view of justice. If something was originally acquired justly, and later transferred justly, then Nozick thinks it is now owned justly—and neither the government nor anyone else should be allowed to take it away.

1. Is an “historical” view of justice incompatible with redistribution? Many things that are owned today—money, land, natural resources—were originally acquired by force and violence, through war and colonization. What should be done about that? Shouldn’t there be some compensation and redistribution?

2. How is it that people can initially come to acquire something justly? Is it simply a matter of finders keepers or first come, first served, or are there other conditions? Are these conditions compatible with redistribution in the future?

3. What about unjust historical transfers? Many things owned today were stolen from someone a long time ago. How should we deal with that?

4. More generally, what is required for transfers of justly owned things to be just?

5. Must people be well-informed buyers in order for transfers to be just? If so, then do we need consumer rights legislation? Do you we need a consumer rights bureau empowered to investigate complaints?

6. Must people have reasonable alternatives in order for a transaction to be just? If so, then do we need welfare and minimum wage laws to make sure that people are not exploited when they’re desperate?

7. If we need any of these background institutions to ensure the fairness of individual voluntary transfers, is it permissible to tax people in order to pay for them?

 

4. Despre libertate si autonomie

Cursul discuta ideile lui John Locke – orice individ are o serie de drepturi inalienabile – viata, libertatea si proprietatea – drepturi naturale, care au existat inainte de a exista forme statale organizate, guverne si alte prostii de genul acesta. Daca dreptul la proprietate, la viata si la libertate  apartin fiintei umane implicit, prin statutul lor de fiinte umane, are dreptul statul sa oblige lumea sa platesca taxe fix pe proprietate, pe libertate si pe viata?

Freedom, equality, property rights, and government by consent—each of these ideas figures prominently in contemporary political thought. And each idea was central to the political thought of John Locke.

Perhaps the best way to begin a discussion of Locke is to consider his views on two important questions: (1) how can private property be justified? and (2) what makes a government legitimate?

The Justification of Private Property

According to Locke, God gave the world to mankind in common. Even so, Locke thinks that people can (and perhaps did) come to have natural rights to privateproperty, even before the institution of government.

For Locke, a thing becomes a person’s private property when he “mixes” his labor with it, provided that the following two conditions are respected. First, the person must not take so much that it will spoil, since God did not make anything to be spoiled. Second, the person must leave “enough and as good” for other people, since God made the earth and its fruits for the benefit of everyone.

In your discussion, try to evaluate Locke’s account of legitimate appropriation.

1. Is mixing your labor with something unowned sufficient to make it your property? If you build a house with your own hands, do you have a reasonable claim to it as your property?

2. If you go to the forest and cut down a tree, are you now the legitimate owner?

3. What if you “mix your labor” with the Atlantic ocean by building a fence around it, or by mixing a can of your homemade tomato juice with it? Does the ocean immediately become your property?

4. Is labor necessary for someone to have a claim to private property? What if a disabled person needs a wheelchair but can’t build one herself? Does she have a right to the wheelchair anyway? If so, what is the basis of this right?

5. Is there more than one justification for property?

6. Locke thinks that legitimate appropriation must not lead to spoilage and must not make other people worse off. However, he thinks that both provisos are easily satisfied once people “consent” to the use of money. After all, money does not spoil, and an economy based on money creates more wealth than an economy based on barter.

Is Locke right to think that people “consent” to the institution of money when they take money as payment? Is Locke right to think that such consent makes even unlimited appropriation legitimate?

The Nature of Legitimate Government

The purpose of Locke’s Second Treatise of Government is to establish the nature of legitimate government. To that end, Locke imagines a “state of nature,” before the institution of government. In the state of nature, everyone is free and equal. Everyone is also bound by the “law of nature,” which commands (1) self-preservation and (2) preserving other people’s lives when this does not conflict with your own self-preservation.

The state of nature is full of “inconveniences,” according to Locke, because it lacks a judge to settle disputes about the law of nature and police officers to enforce the law of nature. To remedy the situation, people decide to leave the state of nature by agreeing to enter into “civil society.” But since they are trying to make their condition better, not worse, they agree only to a limited government that protects their natural rights to life, liberty, and property.

Notice that Locke’s story about the state of nature functions as an argument about legitimate government: a government is legitimate only if people in a state of nature could agree to it without violating the law of nature and without making their own condition worse. Absolute monarchy, for instance, is illegitimate because it gives the monarch more power than the people have a right to give and because it makes them worse off than they would be in a state of nature, with no government.

Critical to Locke’s argument is the idea of “unalienable rights.” Yes, people are free by nature, but “liberty” is not “license.” After all, the law of nature commands people to preserve themselves. Therefore, they must never commit suicide, sell themselves into slavery, or consent to be ruled by an absolute monarch. Their rights to life, liberty, and property are unalienable; they cannot be given away.

1. Consider the idea of unalienable rights and the role they play in Locke’s argument. Why is it that we must not commit suicide or sell ourselves into slavery? God and the law of nature seem to play a big role in Locke’s answer. Is that a problem? Is there some other reason why we must not commit suicide, sell ourselves into slavery, or voluntarily give up other basic rights?

2. In general, what is the difference between liberty and license? Is it possible to abuse a freedom that one has a right to?

3. Locke thinks that, to be legitimate, government must be by consent. But what counts as consent? Must every single person agree to be governed? What if some people hold out unreasonably?

4. Is a government legitimate if everyone could agree to it? What if you never in fact agreed to it, but just happened to find yourself living here? Does merely living somewhere count as consent? If not, is it enough that the government protects your rights? What if you never get to have a say?

5. Locke says that government, once it is set up, should be guided by the principle of majority rule. However, he also says that the purpose of government is to protect people’s unalienable rights, including their right to property. What if these two goals conflict? What if a poor majority wants to tax a rich minority?

5. Despre dreptul unei persoane de a actiona discretionar asupra vietii altei persoane

In acest curs Sandel discuta doua mari teme:

• prima  porneste de a o situatie din timpul Razboiului Civil in care bogatii angajau oameni care sa se duca pe front in locul lor
• a doua discuta despre tehnicile reproductive moderne, mamele surogat, drepturile mamei, cazul Baby M.

These days, it seems that cash is king. But are there things that money shouldn’t be able to buy? Are there things that should not be treated as market goods or services? Consider the following cases.

Civic Duty

In the American Civil War, men who were drafted into the army had the option of hiring a substitute to take their place, or paying a commutation fee to avoid military service. What do you think of these options?

1. Are substitution and commutation tantamount to selling off one’s duty as a citizen?

2. Does the practice of hiring substitutes wrongly exploit poor people who are desperate and have no other option but to agree to be a substitute?

3. Does the morality of buying one’s way out of the army depend on whether it is during a war or in peacetime?

4. What is the moral difference between hiring a substitute and avoiding service by bribery, for instance?

5. Today no one is conscripted. Those who serve in the army volunteer to do so in exchange for a salary and other benefits. What is the relevant moral difference between today’s system and a system of conscription that provides for the option to hire a substitute? Aren’t people who agree to be substitutes merely volunteering to join the army for money?

6. Can utilitarianism, libertarianism, or Lockean rights theory make sense of the view that citizens have a duty to serve their country?

7. Do you think that every citizen has a moral duty either to serve in the military or to perform some form of national service? If so, do you think this duty can be fulfilled by hiring someone else to perform it?

8. “Substitution contracts maximize happiness because they give each party what he most wants—money, and avoidance of military service.” Do you agree? Is this a good argument for the moral permissibility of substitution contracts?

9. “So long as they are voluntary, substitution contracts are fair.” Do you agree? What counts as a voluntary market exchange? Don’t people sometimes enter agreements because they are desperate or not well informed about the full cost or the danger? Do the conditions under which people enter agreements matter to the fairness of the agreements? Do the conditions matter to the validity of the consent? What background conditions are necessary for seemingly voluntary agreements to be fair?

Motherhood

A commercial surrogacy contract is an agreement to carry to term someone else’s baby in one’s own body in exchange for money. What do you think about the morality of such contracts?

1. Should people be allowed to act as surrogate mothers? Should prospective parents be allowed to pay for their services?

2. Suppose the surrogate mother changes her mind and wants to keep the baby. Should surrogacy contracts be enforced by the courts?

3. A utilitarian would say that surrogacy contracts should be allowed, if they maximize happiness. A libertarian would say that people should be free to use their own bodies in whatever way they like, provided they do not violate other people’s rights. What do you think? Do either utilitarians or Libertarians have the right answer?

4. Consider Elizabeth Anderson’s argument against surrogate motherhood. She thinks that surrogate motherhood “commodifies” children and women’s labor. But, thinks Anderson, to value these things in the way one values a commodity is inconsistent with the appropriate way of valuing them. The appropriate way of valuing children, for instance, is to love them, and not to treat them as fungible and exchangeable for money. Therefore, says Anderson, surrogate motherhood is wrong.

Is Anderson right? Does her argument against surrogate motherhood imply that we shouldn’t commodify ourselves either (because that would be inconsistent with valuing ourselves)? So, should we abstain from selling our services to the army, for instance? Is a paid army impermissible?

6. Principiul datoriei morale

In acest curs Sandel prezinta principiul datoriei morale in antiteza cu utilitarianismul prezentat anterior

According to utilitarians, the right thing to do is always to maximize happiness. Libertarians think that the right thing to do is most often to let people do whatever they want. John Locke’s theory says that there are unalienable rights, afforded to every human being by the “law of nature.”

The famous philosopher Immanuel Kant thought that each of these views was mistaken. Against utilitarians, Kant holds that freedom—and not happiness—is the goal of morality; against Libertarians, Kant denies that freedom consists in doing whatever you want; and against Locke, he holds that morality, duty, and rights have their basis in human reason, not in a law of nature.

So who got it right? A good way to broach the discussion is to examine what Kant says about duty, law, humanity, and freedom.

Duty

According to Kant, it’s common sense that you should always do your duty. Moreover, common sense tells you to do the right thing just because it’s the right thing and not for some other reason. Morality is a matter of having the right attitude, or acting for the right reason. It’s your motive that is important.

To explain this idea, Kant imagines a shopkeeper who does not overcharge his customers only because he fears that word of his dishonesty will spread and he’ll lose money. Sure, the prudent shopkeeper does the right thing, so to speak. But he does it for the wrong reason. There’s nothing morally worthy about his action. His honesty is mere prudence, mere selfishness. Kant’s conclusion is that morality consists in doing the right thing for the right reason, or, as he argues, morality is acting from the motive of duty.

Kant imagines a second person, who is naturally sweet and kind and loving. She always does the right thing—but she does it because being good brings her pleasure. Kant thinks this person is not really moral; her actions deserve “praise and encouragement,” but not “esteem.” In a way, they’re just like the actions of the prudent shopkeeper, since they aim at personal pleasure. That’s not morality but habit, argues Kant.. Morality is doing the right thing just because you know it’s the right thing.

Is Kant right about what it is to do your duty?

1. Do you always have to do the right thing just because it’s the right thing?

2. Suppose you tell truth because you’re afraid you’ll be caught lying. Haven’t you done the right thing in the end?

3. Suppose a man rescues someone from drowning only to get a reward. Has he done the right thing?

4. Are children who are brought up to be honest and kind not truly moral?

5. Is your childhood education really just a kind of conditioning, or is there value in it aside from making you reflect on your duty?

6. What is moral character, anyway? Is it what you tend to do, or is it your attitude?

Law

Kant says that morality is doing the right thing for the right reason. But what is the right thing? What is our duty?

Kant’s claim is that our duty is given by the idea of a law—something that tells us what we must do, no matter what. The idea of a law is that it binds everyone, unconditionally. Everyone has to obey it. But this means that, for something to be a law, it must be the case that everyone could obey it. Indeed, says Kant, this is the test for morality. Your action is moral only if it’s done from a motive that everyone else could act on at the same time as you’re acting on it.

Kant demonstrates this test using an example. Suppose you want to swindle your way into some money. You think to yourself, “I’m going to ask my friend to lend me $50, and I’ll promise to pay him back—but I won’t.” Kant thinks your motive doesn’t pass the test. If everyone made false promises in order to get money, and then you tried to make a false promise to get money, it wouldn’t work; your friend wouldn’t believe you, since everyone is always lying. Therefore, your motive is not the kind that everyone else could act on while you’re acting on it, and that means it’s immoral, thinks Kant.

Is this the right test for morality?

1. Kant’s test rules out actions that work by making an exception of yourself. Can you think of other examples of such actions that seem to be immoral?

2. Can you think of exceptional actions that aren’t immoral? Suppose you want to visit a nature preserve. If everyone were to visit at the same time, they would destroy it. But you know they won’t visit, so isn’t it alright for you to go? Is there something problematic about an action that can never be open to everyone? Does Kant have a point?

Humanity

According to Kant, there are different ways to state what our duty is. One of them involves the idea of a law. Another involves the idea of humanity, or human reason. Morality says that you should never treat rational human beings merely as means to your end. Whenever you use someone’s skills or services to your own end, you should always also treat that person as an end in him- or herself.

Since you’re a rational human being, this includes you! Kant thinks that you should never use your own reason merely as a means to your end. Therefore, you must never commit suicide, he thinks. That would be to use your reason to end your own existence, which is incompatible with making your own reason your end.

1. Is Kant right that you must never commit suicide? What if you are terminally ill and in endless pain?

2. More generally, is he right that you must always have humanity or human reason as your end?

3. Is there something immoral about a person who seeks only pleasure—like a couch potato—at the expense of developing his mind?

4. Is it necessarily immoral to sacrifice your life to save a beautiful object, like a painting by Picasso, or the Grand Canyon? Isn’t there something potentially noble about such an action, even if sacrifices your own humanity?

Freedom

Kant thinks that the goal of morality is not happiness but freedom. But freedom is not just doing whatever you want. Kant has a more demanding idea of freedom as self-determination.

You are free in Kant’s sense only if you live by your own reason. If someone brainwashes you into doing something, you are not free. Likewise, if you buy expensive shoes only because you’ve had the desire implanted in you through advertising, then you are also not free. If you eat lots of ice cream because you can’t control your cravings, then you’re also not free. You are little more than a slave to your desires. You lack freedom in each of these cases because it’s not your own reason that makes you do what you do, but something else—another person, your given desires, your natural cravings, and so on. In Kant’s view, you are not fully free.

Is Kant right about freedom?

1. Isn’t freedom just the ability to do what you want, when you want?

2. What difference does it make that some of your desires come from advertising? Or does Kant have a point? Is it possible to be unfree even if no one holds you back?

3. Are smokers fully free? No one keeps them from quitting smoking, but they often still can’t quit, even though they want to. Are these smokers enslaved to their desires, to cigarettes, to their own bodies?

4. Do you have impulses, cravings, or desires that you find it hard to control? Would it be liberating to be able to control them to a greater extent?